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Abstract: 
 
Although international organizations are typically seen as important actors promoting 
better government institutions and reducing corruption, there are few comprehensive 
analysis of how they promote such changes. This paper develops a theoretical 
framework that traces the roots of IO success or failure to factors that are internal to 
the strategies that they employ. We suggest that the tools used by international 
organizations to promote quality of government can be categorized into four groups: 
Inter-state competitive pressures; conditions on economic assistance; interaction with 
transnational actors; and the enlargement of international communities. In contrast to 
accounts that trace the roots of IO success or failure in member states to domestic 
particularities, such as the amount of domestic resistance to government reforms, we 
argue that the mechanisms themselves have a number of shortcomings that reduce 
their effectiveness. Six such factors are identified: imprecise data, market pressures, 
contested policy advice, incomplete internalization and lack of mainstreaming of 
norms by international organizations and member states, and low priority of quality of 
government issues. The paper thereby offers an explanation for why numerous 
empirical studies fail to find a positive correlation between IO measures and better 
government institutions. 
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The detrimental effect of bad government institutions is well established 
(Rothstein and Teorell 2008; OECD 2001; Mauro 1995; Gupta et al 2000). Uncorrupt, 
impartial and competent government institutions are central to deal with some of the most 
important problem of our times, including poverty reduction, climate change and mistrust.1 
Studies that pose the pertinent question of how we can get from a state of bad governance to a 
state where government institutions work well typically point at the potentially important role 
of international organizations (IOs). The political and economic strength of international 
organizations, and their almost unanimous decision to prioritize “good governance” in their 
work, has placed high expectations on their effectiveness in promoting better government 
institutions. By virtue of their political and economic strength it is often assumed that 
international organizations have a central role to play. However, the evidence presented so far 
has been mixed. While broad empirical studies have confirmed the link between international 
integration and reduced levels of corruption (Sanholz & Gray 2003) numerous case studies 
fail to find a positive link between IO engagement and better government institutions (Kelley 
2004; Schimmelfennig 2005). One reason for this is the lack of systematic understanding of 
the different mechanisms at work when international organizations engage with member 
states. 
In an attempt to remedy this state of affairs, this paper proposes a theoretical 
framework that helps us understand the influence of international organizations on 
government institutions. What are the different strategies that international organizations use 
to reduce corruption and promote better government institutions? What are the factors that 
hamper the effectiveness of these strategies? Why do the most common reform strategies of 
international organizations not always live up to expectations? The paper does not attempt to 
produce a comprehensive or complete review of all the work done in this field. Rather, the 
aim is to analyse the mechanisms involved in IO strategies to promote institutional reform. 
We specify four distinct mechanisms that international organizations use to promote better 
governments: Inter-state competitive pressures, conditions on economic assistance, 
interaction with transnational actors and the enlargement of international communities 
(adapted from Alderson 2001: 432). Our suggested distinction between different mechanisms 
                                                 
1 In 1998, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan identified good governance as “perhaps the single most important 
factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development” (UN 1998). 
helps to bring about much needed conceptual clarity to the discussion about how international 
organizations influence the quality of government. In some ways, of course, this 
categorization is artificial as most of these methods are employed by international 
organizations simultaneously. However, by better defining the mechanisms through which 
international integration can have an impact on government institutions, both the strengths 
and the weaknesses of such strategies are revealed. In other words, the paper will show that 
while the mechanisms offer opportunities for reforms, they also carry a number of pitfalls that 
can impede their effectiveness. 
We subsequently use this categorization to explain the dissonance between 
positive accounts of how international organizations can contribute to reduce corruption and 
promote better government institutions on the one hand, and the numerous empirical accounts 
that fail to find such a positive correlation on the other. Past studies have explained failures in 
international organizations’ strategies by looking at conditions that are external to the 
mechanisms employed. In this paper we show that even if perfect external conditions were to 
exist (such as no domestic opposition to good governance reform), the mechanisms 
themselves have drawbacks that can contribute to hampering the success factor. In other 
words, in the process of diffusing norms to member states, there are internal factors within 
these mechanisms that in practice reduce their effectiveness.  
Six such factors are identified. The inter-state competitive pressures mechanism 
is shown to suffer under problems of imprecise data and market pressures. The economic 
assistance mechanism is hampered by contested policy advice. The interaction mechanism has 
a reduced success rate because of a lack of mainstreaming of governance norms within 
international organizations. Finally, the enlargement of international communities’ 
mechanism can fail to have the expected benefits because of incomplete internalization of 
norms by member states and a low priority of QoG issues. In other words, this paper 
illustrates that there is a sharp divide between the theory and practice of international 
integration. 
 
How International Organizations Promote Quality of Government 
 
International organizations are typically expected to have a positive influence on global 
development. Their precise role in international politics is however contested. In the realist 
approach international organizations play primarily a coordinating role in international 
relations. In this approach, states can choose to ignore international organizations whenever 
they conflict with the pursuit of national self-advancement2. Others suggest, however, that 
international organizations can have a deep impact on domestic policy making. Regime 
theorists, for instance, assign a central role to international organizations in this regard. 
International organizations are in this view a source of norms and legitimacy that can 
considerably impact on state behavior (Heinmiller 2007: 657). They enhance cooperation, 
provide a venue for policy formulation, and transfer models of governance internationally 
(Barnett & Finnemore 1999). 
 Socialization theory offers one model for understanding how international 
organizations can diffuse norms to member states. This theory treats international 
organizations as “social environments” wherein states and state agents may be socialized 
through participation (Checkel 2005: 815). Socialization has been defined as “a process of 
inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community” (Checkel 2005: 804). IOs 
have thus been seen as contributing to socialization by connecting countries in networks of 
values and cultural exchanges. Moreover, IOs can contribute to reform by providing specific 
technical expertise or offering normative ideas (Jacoby 2006: 628; Checkel 2001). According 
to Sandholtz and Gray (2003: 769), “the most important IO teacher of norms” in the field of 
good governance is the World Bank. Since the 1990s, the Bank has formulated a set of good 
governance programs that it seeks to implement in its lending practices3. These norms include 
for instance accountability, transparency, public participation, and anti-corruption. The World 
Bank’s good governance norms are thus an example of how IOs can establish standards of 
appropriate behavior that could affect domestic politics. 
This paper focuses on how international organizations promote quality of 
government (QoG), which is defined the part of the broader concept of good governance that 
centre specifically on the qualities of government institutions. Except for government 
institutions playing  a central role for development (Rothstein & Teorell 2008; Holmberg et al 
2009; Akçay 2006; Halperin et al 2005; Kaufmann 2004; Chong and Calderón 2000; Gupta et 
al 2000), there are two other reasons for this paper to focus on the promotion of quality of 
government. First, government reforms have received a high policy priority among 
international organizations. In the early 1990s, the World Bank placed anticorruption and 
                                                 
2 This view is often associated with the works of Krasner (1991) and Mearsheimer (1994) 
3 The World Bank broadly defines good governance as “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a 
country is exercised. This includes (1) the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced, 
(2) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and (3) the respect of 
citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them”. (Kaufmann 
et al. 1999, p. 1).  
good governance on its agenda and soon other international organizations, such as the IMF4 
and the EU, followed suit. They all developed various methods for the diffusion of norms, 
which will be discussed below5. Second, there exists a rich body of literature on the efforts by 
international organizations to spread quality of government, such as transparency and 
anticorruption. Case studies have thus highlighted both successful and unsuccessful cases of 
IO influence. These case studies tend to point out the political conditions of a country as 
factors that contribute to the success or failure of international norm diffusion (Dollar & 
Svensson 2000: 895). This paper, on the other hand, will analyse the practical problems that 
are internal to the mechanisms that international organizations employ to promote quality of 
government.  
Studies on how international organizations influence domestic norms have so far 
offered few systematic accounts of the mechanisms at work when quality of government is 
promoted.6 Sandholtz and Gray’s (2003) empirical study of 150 countries suggests that being 
integrated in international networks of communication through international organizations 
reduces the level of corruption. Their study, however, fails to identify the causal mechanisms 
through which this occurs.7 Furthermore, their conclusion does not always find support in 
other empirical studies on the effect of international integration and government reforms. 
Research on reform agendas in Eastern Europe, for instance, finds that IO strategies that do 
not offer both strong political and economic incentives for countries to adopt better 
government institutions often fail (Kelley 2004; Schimmelfennig 2005). One explanation for 
this apparent contradiction is that socialization effects are hard to measure (Johnston 2001; 
Hooghe 2005; Checkel 2005)8. 
                                                 
4 The declaration Partnership for Sustainable Global Growth that was adopted by the IMF in 1996, identifies 
“promoting good governance in all its aspects, including ensuring the rule of law, improving the efficiency and 
accountability of the public sector, and tackling corruption” as an essential element in promoting economic 
development. 
5 The high priority given to good governance issues and the measures in place in many international 
organizations to encourage member states to improve QoG makes this a good case to study compared to for 
example sustainable development norms, which are also high on the agenda but haven’t been as 
comprehensively promoted by most IOs. Thus although many of the arguments in this paper can be applied to 
other norms spread by IOs, good governance is a good test case because it has come relatively far in being put in 
practice. 
6 For a classification of different methods in which external actors can influence domestic politics to bring about 
reforms, see Jacoby (2006). Jacoby offers three models of norm diffusion: Inspiration, Coalition, and 
Substitution. These focus more on defining the degree on intervention by external actors and the link-up with 
domestic groups than specifying the tools to achieve reform. 
7 Similarly, Bearce and Bondanella (2007) present support for the international socialization theory, but do not 
identify the mechanisms through which this works. 
8 Checkel (2005: 803) mentions a number of empirical challenges in studying socialization, such as how to 
operationalise socialization, develop reliable indicators and obtain good data.  
However, another explanation is that there is gap between how international 
integration occurs in theory as opposed to in practice. While the theoretical underpinnings of 
positive IO influence on QoG are sound, an identification of the causal mechanisms reveals a 
number of practical problems for the benefits of international integration to materialize.  
 
***Figure one about here*** 
 
The mechanisms that will be discussed have been adapted from Alderson’s 
(2001: 432) classification of the most important mechanisms for international norm diffusion. 
These are: a) Inter-state competitive pressures, b) Conditions on economic assistance, c) 
Interaction with transnational actors, d) The enlargement of international communities. 
Alderson calls for these “theory-like generalizations” to be unpacked so as to allow for 
empirical testing. This will be the starting point in the rest of this paper. Each of these 
mechanisms will be explored below with examples of their functioning in practice. The 
analysis will offer an explanation for why important empirical studies have shown weak 
support for the influence of international organizations on government institutions. Figure 1 
summarizes the mechanisms suggested, gives examples of how they work and their intended 
effects as well as the internal factors hampering their effectiveness. These ideas are elaborated 
in the following sections. 
 
Inter-state Competitive Pressures 
 
How can countries be pressured into competing against other states to better their 
governments? In this section, we define inter state competitive pressure as a factor potentially 
promoting better government quality and explore its functioning in practise. We suggest that 
this mechanism can work in at least two different ways: a) through competitive pressures 
associated with governance rankings by international organizations, and b) competition for 
foreign direct investment (FDI). The discussion will look at the theory and practice of inter-
state competitive pressures in order to determine how this method can reduce corruption and 
promote better government institutions. The analysis will show that two particular 
shortcomings may lessen the success rate of these strategies: imprecise data and market 
pressures. 
The first strategy includes rankings used by international organizations. These 
rankings foster a naming and shaming process whereby states are pressured into improving 
their governments as a way to better their image in the world. There are a range of indicators 
and indices that attempt to measure governance and government performance, of which the 
best known is the World Bank’s Governance Indicators. Other partial systems of governance 
ratings, on which the World Bank’s indicators are based, include for instance Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index and Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 
ratings. It has been argued that these ratings serve an important role in encouraging 
government reforms. According to Rotberg (2004: 73), Transparency International’s 
corruption rankings have “managed to shame countries and rulers in Africa and Asia to 
reduce corruption at the national level, leading more nations to seek to be perceived as less 
corrupt”. The rationale for rankings is thus that they can draw attention to the state of 
governments in different countries and provide normative pressure for states to introduce 
reform. They may also contribute to embolden civil society organizations that work with these 
issues so that they can be more effective in their efforts (Rotberg 2004: 73). Thus, in theory, 
rankings should work positively in encouraging quality of government reforms. 
In practice, however, the difficulty in producing objective indicators may work 
against this strategy. This is because current rating systems are based on perceptions and can 
therefore appear as being biased (Rotberg 2004: 72; de Haan & Everest-Phillips 2007). Thus, 
as no rigorous objective criteria to assess quality of government exist, countries at the bottom 
of the rankings may discard them as being political. Low-ranked countries that are strong 
enough to withstand the competitive pressures that this strategy brings into force may choose 
to largely ignore them. Such an example could be seen in certain Middle Eastern countries, 
where many rankings are dismissed as a case of Western bias against their governments. This 
could therefore weaken the positive effect as described in the theory. 
For the ranking mechanism to work at its full potential, then, the indicators need 
to be both accurate and authoritative – qualities that are hard to achieve in practice. Rotberg 
(2004: 84), for example, calls for the setting up of an independent NGO to collect and draw 
up reliable measures of good governance. Although this could potentially solve some of the 
above-mentioned problems, it is not certain that the normative pressure of government 
rankings will be as effective as envisaged in theory. 
The second form of ratings that can give rise to inter state competition is credit 
rating systems and other measures that guide investors. Studies on foreign direct investment 
(FDI) argue that government quality is important in attracting investors to a country. The 
World Bank has produced research that points at investment benefits in countries with high 
QoG9. Furthermore, Blanton & Blanton (2007) argue that respect for human rights is 
positively related to increased FDI inflows, and Busse (2004) finds that democratic rights and 
FDI have a positive correlation. Thus, in theory, if the World Bank predominantly invested in 
developing countries that have taken steps toward improving their governments and reducing 
corruption, the rate of return on those investments would be greater. Such a strategy would 
hence discipline countries into improving their governments so as to attract investment. 
In practice, however, the Bank has a mandate that precludes it from taking 
political considerations into account when making investment decisions. This may explain 
why World Bank investments also go to countries with a very bad government record. As the 
redefinition of the term corruption from being a political issue to being an economic issue 
showed, however, the Bank has scope to direct its lending as it sees fit10. 
The actual problem may be that QoG variables play a lesser role in investment 
decisions than some research has suggested. Bénassy-Quéré et al (2005) have for example 
shown that while government quality matters, investments are predominately directed by 
economic factors such as market size. Similarly, an UNCTAD report on what governments 
can do to attract FDI mentions things like improving infrastructure and skills, but does not 
propose that countries increase accountability or strengthen anti-corruption work (UNCTAD 
2008). 
The most obvious cases when QoG and profitable investments clash are in many 
resource-rich countries. When natural resources are involved, the positive link between 
quality of government and profitable investments often break down. The World Bank has 
made some attempts to reconcile this conflict by agreeing with the resource rich country that 
some of the profits will be used to improve governments and reduce corruption in the country. 
An example of this is the Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline, where the World Bank employed this 
innovative approach in an attempt to break the resource curse11. The idea was that with World 
Bank assistance, the oil venture would result in reducing poverty and improving governance 
in Chad. However, the result of this project has shown that once contracts have been signed, 
the country has little incentive to comply with this agreement (Pegg 2006). 
These problems thus once again highlight that the disciplining effects of inter-
state competitive pressure can be hard to obtain in practice. As will be shown below, these 
                                                 
9 See for example Isham, Kaufmann & Pritchett 1997: p. 237. 
10 This will be discussed further in the next section. 
11 The resource curse refers to the apparent paradox of resource rich countries having lower levels of economic 
development than countries where natural resources are less abundant.( Ross 2003) 
internal contradictions also exist in the three other mechanisms for international norm 
diffusion. 
 
 
Conditions on Economic Assistance  
 
The second mechanism that will be discussed can be described as strategies involving 
conditions placed on economic assistance. These include structural adjustment programs, 
conditionality schemes and other types of financial assistance with strings attached. These 
strategies have frequently been practiced by both states (i.e. the Millennium Challenge 
Account12) and by international organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF. They are 
similar to the last approach in that they add pressure on states to enact institutional reform. 
The difference, however, is that lending and aid are used as tools with a more direct approach 
taken to provide technical advice to bring about reform. As will be shown below, it is the 
contested nature of this policy advice that can reduce the effectiveness of this strategy. 
The objective of conditionality and structural adjustment programs is to “enable 
donors to question aid-recipient countries’ policy structures and processes and to get them to 
alter them according to universal criteria and conditions established by the donors” (Doornbos 
2003: 11). Key reform areas include public sector budgets, the legal system, civil service 
reform, and civil society support. The idea is thus that objective advice is given to 
governments who wish to receive foreign aid or borrow from international financial 
institutions. These financial carrots consequently hinge on good performance, so as to ensure 
that the disbursed resources come to best use (IMF 1997: 8-9). 
In practice, however, “good performance” is hard to achieve. The main problem 
is similar to the difficulties involved in producing objective indicators for which governments 
are good, and which ones are bad.  The theory on which this mechanism builds assumes that 
objective advice is unproblematic. For instance, there is not even agreement on whether 
corruption is a cultural or a structural problem; little less is there agreement on what anti-
corruption measures are most effective (Doig & Riley 2002). What is attempted in placing 
conditions on economic assistance is in fact a form of social engineering that is difficult to 
                                                 
12 The Millennium Challenge Account is a bilateral aid program created by the Bush administration in 2004. It 
works according to the principle that developing countries with good governance are able to make better use of 
the funds received. Countries that are eligible for development aid through the Millennium Challenge Account 
are therefore selected according to a number of criteria, including Civil Liberties, Voice and Accountability, and 
Rule of Law (http://www.mcc.gov/selection/index.php).  
achieve in practice. Grindle (2004), for example, argues that the governance advice offered to 
developing states often is built on a weak theoretical framework that lacks contextual clarity. 
Other critics argue that IOs too often focus on policies that are based in a particular ideology 
that aims at “rightsizing the state”, including trade liberalization and privatization, over other 
institutional factors (Khan 2002; Campbell 2001). 
Thus an extensive body of literature contends that inappropriate policy 
recommendations have made these measures ineffective, and at worst even counter-
productive. Three examples of counter-productive use of economic incentives have been 
pointed out as being particularly significant. First, structural adjustment programs can 
undermine democratic accountability as governments have to conform to the demands of the 
creditors (Ksenia 2008; Whitfield 2005). Second, to the extent that structural adjustment 
programs require reductions in national budgets, corruption could increase due to lower wages 
for civil servants (Ksenia 2008: 223-233). Third, privatization undertaken in areas with weak 
institutions can increase corruption by increasing the opportunities of rent-seeking (Ksenia 
2008: 223-233).13 
One solution to these problems that is often recited in the literature is to increase 
country “ownership”, so as to give greater voice to domestic stakeholders. However, as Kapur 
and Naim (2005, 91) point out, “in a country where democratic checks and balances are weak, 
‘ownership’ may be little more than a sign of the stranglehold that vested interests have on 
national policy”. In other words, ownership does not guarantee better policies. If governments 
are corrupt or captured by vested interests, ownership may neither make policies better nor 
more legitimate. 
So there do not appear to be any quick fixes to the problems that hamper this 
mechanism from bringing about the desired institutional development. Perhaps when the 
theoretical foundations of policy advice have been strengthened will the strategy of placing 
conditions on economic assistance work more like the theory posits. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 See also Rose-Ackerman (1996): “Although privatizing state-owned enterprises reduces opportunities for 
corruption, the privatization process itself can create corrupt incentives. A firm may pay to be included in the list 
of qualified bidders or to restrict their number. It may pay to obtain a low assessment of the public property to be 
leased or sold off, or to be favored in the selection process. Before reforms to the process in Argentina, for 
example, privatizations allegedly favored those with inside information and connections, as have some 
privatizations in the former Eastern bloc”.  
Interaction with Transnational Actors 
 
The third mechanism – interaction with transnational actors – involves social learning. This 
mechanism works through the agency of “norm entrepreneurs” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) 
who seek to propagate norms internationally. The mechanism works by introducing 
international norms, such as transparency and anticorruption, to domestic audiences and elites 
through IO-led interactions such as workshops, capacity building, and knowledge-sharing14. 
The idea is that countries will emulate behaviours that they view as internationally respectable 
in order to fit into the community of nations (Landolt 2004: 582). However, as the analysis 
below will show, this strategy struggles to have the intended effects because of the lack of 
mainstreaming of norms within international organizations. 
According to the theory, agents can form new identities and shape alternative 
attitudes through interaction with transnational actors. Examples of this are the change in 
attitudes in many parts of the world after the negotiations of the Anti-Corruption Convention, 
capacity building in the field of human rights, and knowledge-sharing about increasing 
transparency in budget processes. One of the mechanisms through which these kinds of 
international interactions can result in norm diffusion is for example individual attitude 
change as a result of persuasion and political pressure (Alderson 2001: 420).  
However, the implementation of governance reforms has neither been universal 
nor complete. The lack of resonance with domestic understandings is usually given as one 
factor for why this mechanism may fail to influence norms (Acharya 2004). What is less 
frequently discussed, however, is the internal contradictions of this mechanism. They can be 
viewed as stemming from a fundamental flaw in the literature, namely a “selection bias [that 
suggests] that the West promotes only liberal or progressive norms” (Landolt 2004: 581). The 
implication of this is that the literature omits the possibility that international organizations 
project conflicting norms. Such a possibility arises not least when international organizations 
engage in transnational interactions that do not explicitly have an objective of quality of 
government promotion. 
International organizations perform a wide number of tasks in which they 
engage member countries. These interactions could lead to the promotion of sometimes 
conflicting norms (Bauhr 2009). The international climate change regime can be used to 
                                                 
14 Another form of interaction with transnational actors is direct intervention in a country to promote specific 
reforms (Jacoby 2006). Such an example is the intervention in Kosovo and the subsequent set-up of an 
international authority. However, these efforts are more directly led by certain countries, i.e. they are not 
initiated by international organizations themselves. 
illustrate this point. International organizations, such as UN agencies and the World Bank, 
play a central role in promoting measures against climate change in developing countries, 
either through market mechanisms or more traditional aid. The system that has attracted the 
greatest international attention so far is perhaps the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), 
the first global market mechanism in international environmental law and the largest market 
for offsets.  The system allows developed countries to invest in developing countries in order 
to comply with their internationally agreed emission reduction targets. Thus, the CDM has no 
primary or explicit objective of transferring quality of government norms. Nevertheless, 
through the number of interactions during the project processes, participants’ attitudes and 
norms may shift as a result of the new influences. Unfortunately, the accounts of the 
institutional set-up of the CDM have not been very positive. Critics argue that the CDM rules 
are such that they create perverse incentives and that the mechanism promotes corruption and 
outright fraud (McCully 2008; Davies 2007)15.  
Thus, interaction with international organizations does not necessarily promote 
better government institutions. The influence of international organizations may be 
determined by important conditions including the effect of IO reforms on the impartiality and 
predictability of the international system (Bauhr & Nasiritousi, forthcoming). Furthermore, 
when international organizations do not consequently act according to the norms they 
officially promote when engaging in transnational interactions, mixed signals may be sent that 
reduce social learning on quality of government norms. This conclusion was echoed in an 
independent review of the World Bank’s anti-corruption efforts. The study identified several 
shortcomings in the Bank’s efforts to fight corruption around the world. One of the key 
findings was the lack of mainstreaming and leadership on the issue: 
 
A lack of common purpose, distrust, and uncertainty has enveloped the anticorruption work of the Bank. What is 
important in that effort is achieving a clear sense of direction, bringing into concert the disparate units of the 
Bank, some of which have failed to recognize the importance of anticorruption and governance efforts in 
working with client nations. (Volcker 2007: 9-10)16 
 
Thus the report recommends that the Bank integrates the good governance paradigm into its 
own programs in order to ensure the integrity of its projects. With better mainstreaming of 
                                                 
15 Also “C is for Unclean”, Down To Earth Magazine, VOL 16 ,NO 14, December 2007, 
http://www.downtoearth.org.in/cover.asp?foldername=20071215&filename=news&sid=41&sec_id=9; “What’s 
CDM about?”, Down to Earth Magazine, VOL 14 ,NO 12   Monday, November 07, 2005, 
http://www.downtoearth.org.in/cover.asp?foldername=20051115&filename=anal&sid=4&page=7&sec_id=7&p
=1 
16 For a similar analysis, see Woods (2000). 
quality of government norms within international organizations, therefore, the interaction with 
transnational actors mechanism may become more successful in diffusing these norms. 
 
 
The Enlargement of International Communities 
 
The final mechanism that will be discussed is the membership process of certain international 
organizations. This strategy has frequently been studied within the context of EU accession 
conditions, which have proven effective in bringing about the requested reforms in aspiring 
member states (Jacoby 2006: 646). In fact, this mechanism – also called political 
conditionality – has empirically been shown to be the most effective in spreading quality of 
government (Kelley 2004; Schimmelfennig 2005). However, even this mechanism suffers 
from shortcomings that may impede its effectiveness. The discussion below identifies two 
factors that reduce the chances for successful diffusion of quality of government through this 
method: incomplete internalization of norms by member states and low priority bestowed to 
certain QoG issues. 
The enlargement of international communities is a method that uses carrots and 
sticks to motivate countries to undertake government reform. Countries wishing to join the 
European Union must for example comply with a set of political and economic conditions – 
known as the Copenhagen Criteria. The political conditions include provisions about such 
issues as human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and minority rights17. Because of the 
significant benefits associated with EU membership, an accession country faces both political 
and economic incentives to fulfill the membership criteria. 
Nevertheless, even this tool faces a number of limitations. Except for the fact 
that only a limited number of international organizations (can) employ such rigorous 
conditions for membership (for example because they already have universal membership or 
lack the means to impose conditions18) – thus reducing the applicability of this tool – two 
other issues can lessen its effectiveness. First, international organizations vary in the degree of 
authority and capabilities that are required to succeed in promoting quality of government. 
Ambrosio (2008: 1324) argues that there is a positive correlation between what he calls 
                                                 
17 See Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council, 21-22 June 1993, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/pdf/cop_en.pdf  
18 The Council of Europe could be given as an example, where countries are rather accepted than rejected even if 
their human rights standards are not adequate. 
international organizations with high “democratic density” – i.e. where most members19 are 
democracies – and the success rate of spreading these norms. Analogous to this is that 
member states as well as the international organizations that place conditions on new 
members must themselves have embodied the required norms. Studying the example of the 
EU’s effort to spread the norm of transparency to accession countries, Grigorescu (2002) 
shows that it is more difficult for IOs to spread norms that existing member states have 
themselves not fully internalized: “This lack of a commonly accepted transparency norm in 
member states has led to difficulties in the adoption of mechanisms through which IOs can 
promote such a norm.” (p. 482). 
Second, and related to the first point, is that when international organizations 
prioritize some membership conditions over others, the less-prioritized reforms may not be 
implemented. Sandholtz & Gray (2003: 793) suggest that anti-corruption reform was not a 
prioritized area in the enlargement process involving the Eastern European accession 
countries. Although anti-corruption was a condition for membership, pre-accession reports 
about prospective members rarely dwelled on the topic. Instead, Sandholtz and Gray (2003: 
794) argue that the EU prioritized economic reforms and compliance with EU regulations 
over other reforms. Consequently, the EU had to deal with corruption problems in new 
member states after accession. It found the level of corruption in Bulgaria so alarming in 2008 
as to warrant the withholding of some EU funds20. 
The reason for why corruption issues were not prioritized in the accession 
process may have been due to the thorny nature of the issue and the fact that corruption 
problems within the EU’s own institutions are perceived as being widespread. Alternatively, it 
is conceivable that organizations have to prioritize certain conditions for membership when 
there are numerous reform areas that are considered important. Not giving equal attention to 
all conditions for accession in turn creates the problem of assessing when the membership 
conditions have in fact been fulfilled. Of particular importance for this mechanism to work 
effectively is that the granting of membership does not become a matter of diplomatic 
decision-making where some countries get accepted based on political considerations without 
having fulfilled the conditions. Otherwise, if certain countries get accepted as a matter of 
political expediency rather than because they fulfil the accession criteria, the incentive to 
improve governments are weakened. This is particularly true if potential member countries 
                                                 
19 Or member states with the greatest influence in the organization. 
20 Elitsa Vucheva, Bulgaria under fire for corruption levels, EUobserver, 17.07.2008, 
http://euobserver.com/9/26504  
 
come to view that the membership criteria do not in fact matter. Thus what is important for 
this mechanism to work effectively is that international organizations and their member states 
internalize the norms that they put out as conditions for membership and that the conditions 
are assessed consistently and even-handedly. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper poses the difficult question of how bad governments become better. In particular, 
it analyzes the role of international organizations in promoting better governments. The 
analysis shows that even if international organizations have powerful tools to influence 
quality of government, the mechanisms and strategies that they employ suffer from internal 
shortcomings that significantly limit their influence. The paper defines four main strategies 
for IO influence: Inter-state competitive pressures, conditions on economic assistance, 
interaction with transnational actors and the enlargement of international communities. Our 
analysis of case studies and comparative studies show that these mechanisms suffer from a 
number of specific internal shortcomings that hamper their effectiveness: Imprecise data, 
market pressures, contested policy advice, lack of mainstreaming of norms within 
international organizations, incomplete internalization of norms by member states, and low 
priority of QoG-issues. 
 While case studies abound, few studies attempt to develop a comprehensive 
theoretical framework for the influence of international organizations on quality of 
government. The framework developed in this paper is an attempt to bring much needed 
conceptual clarity to the discussion on how international organizations reduce corruption and 
promote better government institutions.  It also contributes to explaining the dissonance 
between the strong theoretical tenets for IO influence and the numerous case studies that fail 
to find a link between international integration and quality of government reform. 
 Moreover, in contrast to much of the literature that attributes shortcomings or 
failures to country specific particularities, such as the amount of domestic resistance to 
reforms, the framework focuses on weaknesses that are internal to the mechanisms that the 
international organizations employ. This is important since reforms focusing on internal 
weaknesses could potentially have an effect across different contexts. In other words, holding 
the external factors that can weaken the effects of IO work in promoting quality of 
government constant, this paper suggests that substantial benefits can be reaped by also 
looking into problems internal to the mechanisms of norm diffusion. 
A better theoretical and practical understanding of how international 
organizations can promote quality of government is of fundamental importance to deal with 
some of the central challenges that face the world today. Such challenging problems as 
reducing poverty and greenhouse gas emissions are dependent upon functioning and effective 
government institutions. While international organizations may well hold the key to the 
direction that these global developments will take, the effectiveness of international 
organizations in this area may depend on how they refine their strategies to promote change in 
member countries. A challenge for scholars is to offer theories and assessments of how the 
internal limits of strategies aimed at promoting government quality identified in this paper 
interact with domestic and other external factors. This would further contribute to determining 
the role that international organizations will play in meeting future global challenges.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. How International Organizations Promote Quality of Government (QoG) 
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a) Governance rankings a) Governments enact reforms to 
improve country image  
a) Lack of objective data 
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